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ABSTRACT. In a previous work, entitled African Philosophy of Education 
Reconsidered: On Being Human (Waghid, 2014), a defense is offered for the notion 
of African philosophy as a reasoned and culture-dependent concept on the basis that 
any philosophical genre cannot be devoid of reasonableness and dismissive of 
culture. The premise on which the latter claim is built is two-fold: Firstly, any form 
of philosophizing involves (and ought to do so) an aspiration towards the attainment 
of what can be conceived as being reasonably justifiable – that is, reasons are 
offered and amended to elucidate meanings that can be convincing to others in the 
inquiry; and secondly, meanings are (re)constructed and deconstructed on the basis 
of people’s cultural stock (a term I borrow from Jane Roland Martin, 2013) – that is, 
people’s images, attitudes, backgrounds, symbols and other ways of seeing things in 
the world. Thus, as a combination, reasonableness and culture determine what 
constitutes African philosophy. In this way, it would not be implausible to embrace 
explications of African philosophy that connect with the reasons people offer on 
account of their ethical orientations, indigenous perspectives, and/or sagacious 
utterances. This is what makes African philosophy a reasoned and culture-dependent 
practice. But then, as with any form of philosophy, African philosophy foregrounds 
culture in so far as it provides the notion of knowledge with a distinctive form in 
relation to what Africa has to offer. Put differently, knowledge(s) are a manifestation 
of the ways in which philosophy organizes cultural understandings on the African 
continent. This article examines at least three ways in which culture is organized 
through an African philosophical discourse, and how knowledges are manifested in 
the practices of people on the continent: Firstly, African philosophy guides cultural 
practices in accordance with practices of communal interactions – that is, Ubuntu 
(human interdependence); and, when Ubuntu is under threat, ethnic conflict, 
political tension and strife seem to hold sway. Secondly, African philosophy 
orientates people towards an appreciation of an ethical life and, when the latter is 
tangibly at risk, destruction is perilously imminent; and thirdly, African philosophy 
inclines people towards some higher good, and when the latter is visibly absent, 
religious conflict seems to be hazardously omnipresent. My understanding is that 
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Ubuntu, ethics and an inclination towards a higher good are cultural practices that 
give knowledge, as understood by Africans, a distinctively reasonable form. In short, 
the reasonableness of African knowledge(s) is guided by an appreciation of 
Africans’ cultures. And, when these cultures are at risk, the potential exists that 
African knowledge(s) will become misguided.  
 




Africans and their communities have cultures that are unique to the 
enactment of peoples’ lives on the African continent. The multiple ways in 
which people live on the continent in response to other human beings, the 
environment, political and socio-economic contexts are tantamount to 
patterns of human engagement that often are couched as people’s indigenous 
cultures. In other words, the forms of life – to borrow from Wittgenstein – 
Africans enact on the continent constitute their indigenous cultures. For the 
reason that people’s ways of engaging with others and their contexts are 
relational, the term “indigenous” is used. It is African people’s indigenous 
cultures that depict the relational experiences of Africans to others and their 
contexts, and not that Africans have indigenous cultures that often are 
contrasted with what is perceived to be cultures that are not indigenous – that 
is, non-indigenous “Western” cultures. It does not make sense to talk about 
non-indigenous cultures, as all cultures involve humans’ relational 
experiences with others and their contexts. So the claim that African cultures 
are indigenous on the basis that such cultures differ from other cultures is 
implausible, as all cultures – whether African or non-African – are 
indigenous to their peoples and contexts.  
Similarly, if philosophy is a way in which people understand, organize 
and enact their cultures, then African philosophy is a discourse according to 
which people’s understandings, organization and enactment of their cultural 
experiences are being made sense of. That is, African philosophy is a 
discourse that gives a reasonable account of the enactment of people’s 
cultural ways of being. It is for this reason that Paulin Hountondji’s (2002) 
critique of African philosophy as ethnophilosophy does not make sense. For 
him, ethnophilosophy depicts Africans’ cultural experiences as 
incommensurable with rules of “strict science”. He warns against “the 
temptation of a reductive, unilateral, and overly simplifying reading of 
cultures, and especially, of the worldviews of the African continent” 
(Hountondji, 2002: 81). His valorization of “science” seeks to locate African 
philosophy as a legitimate form of methodological inquiry with the same 
aims as that of any other philosophy in the world within the geographical 
context of its authors (Hountondji, 2002: 126). For him, oral narratives of 
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people’s cultural experiences cannot be considered to be philosophy, as such 
narratives are not “scientific”. Now, if “scientific” is a term that explains the 
justifications that are offered in defense of particular views, then it does not 
mean that the term cannot be applicable to African philosophy. African 
philosophy, as mentioned earlier, is a way in which people’s cultural, social, 
political, economic and religious practices are justified. Hence, a 
justification of people’s cultures can be associated with what it means to be 
scientific. And, if Africans’ cultures are explained and reasons are offered in 
defense of particular ways of being, then it seems plausible to talk about a 
justification of practices – practices that involve Africans’ cultural 
experiences. So, to claim that Africans’ understanding, organization and 
enactment of their cultural experiences is not “scientific” is to assume that 
such practices cannot be justified; more specifically, reasons cannot be 
rendered for their existence. Consequently, Hountondji’s harsh criticism of 
African philosophy as ethnophilosophy, and therefore not strictly 
philosophy, does not necessarily hold water.  
This brings me to a discussion of the cultural experiences of Africans in 
relation to communal action as reasons why such reason-dependent cultures 
can be exposited as manifestations of African philosophical discourse.  
 
2. Communal Action as Constitutive of African Philosophical Discourse 
 
The concept of Ubuntu (human interdependence) has been in vogue in 
Africa for many years and gained academic prominence under the leadership 
of the then South African president, Thabo Mbeki. Mbeki was intent on 
promoting the idea of an African renaissance in a quest to advance a case for 
Africa’s intellectual, political and economic independence, much in the same 
way as Leopold Senghor, Jomo Kenyatta and other African leaders before 
him. In a way, he reintroduced the concept of Africanism as a means to 
continue on the path of decolonization. His accentuation of Ubuntu 
alongside the idea of an African renaissance not only propelled the quest to 
decolonize Africa, but more importantly to foreground a way of doing along 
the lines of communality and human interdependence. In other words, Africa 
would become economically independent and politically autonomous if 
Africans exhibited a seriousness to work together – a matter of exercising 
Ubuntu. The idea that individual action becomes subjected to social action, 
and that individuality should be directed at achieving social goals for all 
Africans, has mostly been inspired by Ubuntu – that is, “I am because we 
are”. It is this idea of Ubuntu that has been proclaimed in contestation of 
corrupt, antagonistic and nepotistic practices that favored mostly narcissistic 
individualism associated with leadership in ongoing tribal and ethnic wars, 
religious conflicts, and instances of genocide on the continent. Of course, the 
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argument can be used that African philosophy advocates Ubuntu (human 
interdependence and co-operation), yet there is perpetual conflict and 
violence on the continent, which suggests that Ubuntu as a practice on the 
continent is non-existent. Of course the latter is an indefensible claim. There 
are several and multiple examples on the continent to show that communities 
live in a spirit of Ubuntu, and often the most violent incidences are 
highlighted and used by critics of Ubuntu to show that the concept is not 
only problematic, but that it actually does not exist in the lived experiences 
of people. If violence persists in some communities it is evident that Ubuntu 
has not been internalized by them, but this is not an indication that the 
concept is not enacted. It is for this reason that African philosophical 
discourse can be used to make Ubuntu more pronounced – a matter of 
offering reasons why some violent communities on the continent should use 
the notion of human interdependence and dignified co-operation and 
coexistence to possibly subvert unreasonable and disdainful actions such as 
conflict, wars and violence. The point is, African philosophical discourse 
offers Ubuntu as a communal problem-solving practice that can counteract 
even the potential of violence. To my mind, South Africa offered a pertinent 
example of how hatred and violence can be quelled through the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, where Ubuntu as human interdependence 
through forgiveness was used to subvert possible violent action. That is, the 
cultural experiences associated with living on the African continent were 
used as a way to cultivate human coexistence – a matter of African 
philosophy having been enacted. Commensurable with the Deweyan idea 
that democratic experience is socially enacted, Ubuntu as a manifestation of 
human interdependence and dignified co-existence was understood and 
enacted to prevent the possibility of a human tragedy associated with a 
violent post-apartheid revolution.  
 
3. African Philosophical Discourse as an Appreciation of Ethical Life  
 
African philosophical discourse has a very strong leaning towards an ethical 
pursuit of becoming a balanced individual (Bewaji, 2004: 396). In other 
words, a person is obliged to cultivate ethically his or her well-being in the 
interest of community. As poignantly noted by Bewaji (2004: 396), “each 
person is a representative of himself or herself as well as of his or her family 
… [which] has the implication that an individual has to consider not only 
how a course of action contemplated by him will affect him personally, but 
also how it will affect his family … in terms of the way in which they will be 
perceived by society”. Similarly, the community also does not reduce its 
responsibility toward the individual, so that the moral obligation that arises 
between the individual and the community is “an interactive one” (Bewaji, 
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2004: 397). In support of the ethical responsibility of both individuals and 
society towards each other, Gbadegesin (1991: 66–67) posits “… [that] 
community is founded on notions of an intrinsic and enduring relationship 
among its members”. Moreover, the basis of ethics in African philosophical 
discourse in relation to situating the self authentically in community with 
others is human welfare. Following Wiredu (1980: 6), ethics in African 
cultures is motivated by humanistic considerations: 
 
It has often been said that our traditional outlook was intensely 
humanistic. It seems to me that, as far as the basis of the 
traditional ethic is concerned, this claim is abundantly justified. 
Traditional thinking about the foundations of morality is 
refreshingly non-supernaturalistic. Not that one can find 
traditional sources elaborate theories of humanism. But anyone 
who reflects on our traditional ways of speaking about morality is 
bound to be struck by the preoccupation with human welfare: 
What is morally good is what befits a human being: it is what is 
decent for man [and woman] – what brings dignity, respect, 
contentment, prosperity, joy, to man [and woman] and his [her] 
community. And what is morally bad is what brings misery, 
misfortune, and disgrace.  
 
What follows from the aforementioned understanding of ethics is that it is 
not only found in the cultural (and religious) practices of Africans, but 
motivated by the concern to be in service of humanity in all aspects of 
human life. In other words, ethics in Africa is strongly humanistic. However, 
the human predicaments we witness on the African continent from time to 
time are instigated by sporadic surges of atomistic individualism that bring a 
concern for human welfare into conflict with other despotic and patriarchal 
imperatives, such as to dominate people and to exclude them from authentic 
ways of living – in peace, stability and prosperity. However, despite the 
lapses in living ethically, African cultures are still concerned innately with 
living worthwhile lives, as cogently stated by Wiredu (1980: 6): 
 
There is an aesthetic strain in our traditional ethical thought that is 
worthy of special mention in this connection. As noted already, 
what is good is conceived to be what is fitting … what is fitting is 
what is beautiful … There are, indeed, aesthetic analogies in the 
moral language of other cultures. But aesthetic analogies are taken 
much more seriously and have more extensive moral relevance in 
pour traditional thought. 
 
Consequently, in African philosophical discourse, the authenticity of an 
ethical life is determined by concerns to advance both morality and human 
welfare on the continent within a spirit of community.  
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In keeping with the themes of an ethical, humanistic and community-
conscious approach to knowledge cultures, the following contributions offer 
some account of why and how these themes can be interrelated: 
N’Dri Assié-Lumumba offers a cogent account of why “cultural 
authenticity” is important for African (higher) education to transform its 
colonial influences. The implication for an African philosophical discourse 
is that cultural agency should be recognized as legitimate if such a discourse 
were to be influential in shaping African education systems. More 
specifically, African traditions and languages, she argues, ought to 
recognized as enabling conditions for the post-colonization of African 
society.  
Berte van Wyk argues the need for the reconstruction of indigenous 
Khoisan identities with regard to their rights, epistemologies and language. 
The problematic is defined by the erosion of their rights in a democratic 
dispensation that seemingly disregards their epistemologies related to the 
land, the importance of community and the prominence of indigenous (not 
traditional) leadership. 
Nuraan Davids explores the marginalization of Muslim women in a 
cultural and religious context and how they might navigate the space 
between preserving a culture and, at the same time, resisting the oppressive 
structures therein in order to produce a particular form of knowledge. This 
expression of identity, inclusivity and belonging contributes and defines a 
unique perspective of education and culture and makes claim to an 
autonomous agency that promotes critical engagement and social activism. 
Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo offers an account of knowledge production 
in contemporary Africa by addressing epistemological issues such as the 
definitions, conceptualization and consumption of knowledge with a view to 
ways of bringing about social transformation. The present problematic is 
defined by the neoliberal interests in knowledge production and is 
historically hampered by a European colonial legacy, necessitating a much-
needed critical theory of African knowledge systems that avoids the 
romanticization of an African past, but rather focuses on transformative 
knowledge. 
Tracey Isaacs argues in defense of critical student agency and how this 
concept might inform education relating to the post-colonial subject. 
Through a contemplation of decolonizing agency that displays resistance and 
self-expression, she avers that students subvert the destructive socio-
historically constructed and imposed definitions of their particular reality. 
Joseph Divala contends that the development of knowledge should be in 
consonance with an African metaphysical understanding of being. He 
accentuates the importance that an appropriate understanding of Ubuntu is 
used in the development of knowledge in African universities. 
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Rachel Ndinelao Shanyanana builds on a critical notion of Ubuntu by 
bringing an understanding of the silences of marginalized groups (the poor, 
people with disabilities, women, homosexuals), and the instances that 
characterize them as unequal members of an assumed equal society to the 
fore. She accounts for such a notion of Ubuntu by bringing it into contention 
with inadequate transformation of higher education in Africa and forces a 
consideration of how to curtail exclusionary practices. 
Philip Higgs’s post-modern narrative conceptualizes how knowledge 
cultures are local but also inter-subjective, opening up an avenue for plural 
conversations that result in cross-cultural dialogue and understanding. He 
posits that such a move develops an epistemic identity that accommodates 
alternative forms of knowing premised on a knowledge culture that 
incorporates the moral, political and social relations defined by commitment, 
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